Extensive Capture: the rise of international industrial regulation by Marquez, Carlos
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Extensive Capture: the rise of
international industrial regulation
Carlos Marquez
March 2007
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3642/
MPRA Paper No. 3642, posted 20. June 2007
  1
EXTENSIVE CAPTURE: THE RISE OF INTERNATIONAL INDUSTRIAL 
REGULATION  
By: Carlos Pablo Márquez Escobar+ 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This research project tries to show that a unified discourse and a single global policy for 
liberalization and competition cuts across the economic and legal theory of transnational 
regulations of industry. The tension mediated by the concepts of harmonization, meaning 
that one regulation/standard is better that multiple regulations/standards, and the theory of 
international liberalization, meaning deregulation is better that regulation, brings many 
doubts about the phenomenon of international industrial regulation. The core of this 
project is to restate the problem of regulatory capture at a transnational level and show 
how it is possible, and profitable, for large corporations to capture transnational 
regulators with multilateral regulation or deregulation processes.  
 
Keywords: International industrial regulation, international law, soft law, hard law, 
harmonization, industrial organization, law and economics.  
 
CAPTURA EXTENSA: EL CRECIMIENTO DE LA REGULACIÓN  
INDUSTRIAL INTERNACIONAL 
 
RESUMEN 
 
Este proyecto de investigación intenta demostrar que un discurso unificado y una única 
política global para la liberalización de los mercados y el incremento de la competencia 
corta la teoría económica y legal la regulación transnacional de la industria. La tensión 
mediada por los conceptos de la armonización, significando que una única 
regulación/estándar es mejor que regulaciones/estándares múltiples, y la teoría de la 
liberalización internacional de los mercados, significando que la desregulación es mejor 
que la regulación, causa muchas dudas sobre el fenómeno de la regulación industrial 
internacional. El núcleo de este proyecto es exponer como es posible modificar el análisis 
del problema de la captura del regulador en un nivel transnacional y demostrar cómo es 
posible, y provechoso, para las grandes corporaciones capturar reguladores 
transnacionales con procesos multilaterales de regulación o desregulación.  
 
Palabras clave: Regulación industrial internacional, derecho internacional, soft law, hard 
law, armonización, organización industrial, análisis económico del derecho. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The present of International Economic Law is the legal system of international trade and 
the WTO. The future, however, is the transnational regulation of industry. Certainly, 
since the 1980s, regulations of different industries have had a transnational impact. 
Regulation of financial markets and certain environmental regulation, among others, are 
examples of this phenomenon, which rapidly expanded to several other areas of industrial 
regulation after it attracted the attention of legal and economic scholarship1. Despite their 
interest, however, only a few scholars have been critically concerned about one of the 
most important theoretical constructions behind the expansion of industrial regulation: 
regulation harmonization. Harmonization has been studied in the economic literature, 
mostly related to financial, stock markets and antitrust regulation, leading usually to 
conclusions highlighting the advantages of harmonization2 for liberalization, free trade 
and competition3. Nevertheless, despite of the evident tension in concomitant discourses 
for liberalization and regulation4, it is unbelievable how, when referring to transnational 
regulation scholars seem to forget asking if harmonization is a result of capture.5   
 
The goal in this research project is to show that a unified discourse and a single global 
policy for liberalization and competition cuts across the economic and legal theory of 
transnational regulations of industry, and this inherent tension reveals regulatory capture. 
The evident tension is mediated by the concept of harmonization, meaning that one 
regulation/standard is better that multiple regulations/standards, and the theory of 
international liberalization, meaning deregulation is better that regulation. The concept of 
harmonization is mediating such tension since it is discriminately regarded as beneficial 
for certain markets but prejudicial for other markets, and this inconsistency is just an 
effect of capture. The core of my project is to restate the problem of regulatory capture at 
a transnational level and show how it is possible and profitable for large corporations to 
capture transnational regulators with multilateral regulations or deregulations. The 
                                                
1 A simple search in J-Store (Business, Finance, Law, Political Science and Public Policy) of the words 
regulation & harmonization in title, abstract and text body showed 23 articles from 1887 to 1945, 127 
from 1946 to 1965, 406 from 1966 to 1985, and 794 from 1986 to 2002. In this last period, from 1986 to 
1990 there were 152 articles, 256 from 1991 to 1995, 289 from 1996 to 2000, and 156 from 2000 to 2001. 
The expansion of literature after 1985 indicates some correlation between the promotion of world 
liberalization by the US and UK government and the subsequent increase interest in harmonization and 
globalization.  
2 Some authors say that it is certainly more convenient to be able to use the same mobile phone in different 
countries, buy a wireless Internet link that can be sold all over the world, it will generate more profits and 
presumably more jobs.  
3See ROBERT PAHRE, LEADING QUESTIONS: HOW HEGEMONY AFFECTS THE 
INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY (U. Mich., Press., 1999). 
4 See infra text pages 2 and 2. Also see Beth Simmons Capital Markets Regulation. 55 INT. 
ORGANIZATION. 589, 615-20 (2001) (showing why the harmonization debate has been misleading and 
proposing a method to approach to the problem of harmonization in financial markets). 
5 The word capture here has several meanings in the literature. Here it follows Hansons, Yosifons, 
Benforados and Chens work. Capture goes beyond the stiglerian meaning -as capture of the regulator due 
to the action of pressure groups- and goes to a new appreciation called deep capture capture of the 
regulation by capturing knowledge structures, social cognition, and behavior. We will explain what is the 
meaning of capture and the importance of the concept of capture for structuralism and critical realism.  
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premise is that internationalization of regulation gives capture an extensive effect and 
makes it more profitable for large corporations.  
 
What makes capture profitable is not the advertised positive effect of harmonization in 
competition and market efficiencies but its incidence to enhance control over national 
regulators, national regulation and international commercial regulation. Thus, the project 
is trying to find a framework to explain why harmonization, as a legal concept, is 
advertised and promoted as a way to improve the positive effects of liberalization and 
competition, legitimizing just one model of industrial regulation and delegitimizing the 
possibilities of regulatory alternatives and regulatory competition.  
 
To explain the relevance for the legal and economic literature and the necessity of a 
realistic approach to the International Economic Law of Industrial Regulation6, the 
project will be divided in two parts, excluding introduction and conclusions. First, we 
explain the basis and goals of the dissertation, including the methodology to approach to 
the problem and its relevance for legal and economics scholarship; Second, we will show 
how the questions presented are novel for scholarship in the field. 
 
II. CAPTURE AND HARMONIZATION 
 
The minimum theoretical background to understand the set of hypothesis and the 
methodologies to address the problem of capture in international regulation is based on 
showing how to (re)take power7 seriously for studying capture in International Economic 
Law8. Concomitantly, we will explain why the analysis of power, in structuralism and 
social psychology, provides an alternative approach to study the problem of capture and 
harmonization in transnational industrial regulation and, thus, arid perspective of the 
dynamics of power in the international economic law of industry regulation.  
 
a. Where Economics and Regulation Meet Power  
 
Structural philosophy9 and social psychology have been more conscious than neo-
classical economics of the dynamics of power in the interaction of human beings10. 
                                                
6 See Pablo Marquez y Alfonso Miranda. Intervención Pública, Regulación Administrativa y Economía: 
Elementos para definir los objetivos de la regulación. Universitas Ciencias Jurídicas (Indexada), No. 108, 
p. 71-118, Bogotá, (2004). 
7 See Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation: an Introduction to the Situational Character, Critical 
Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture. 152, U. PA. L. REV. 129, 134-39 (2003) (arguing that 
mainstream law and economics has not developed an economic analysis of the rise of law and economics as 
a school of thought and the possible inner tensions on it).  
8 See Id. at 193-98, 212-30. 
9 Structuralism refers, broadly, to the genealogy and structure of meaning in several epistemes. Here we are 
not referring to the work of Saussure and others but the work of Michel Foucault. We are cataloguing 
Foucault as structuralist despite of his rejection to catalogue his work as structural. However, his early 
work, which is the one I will use, is structural and there is no other reason but passion to reject it as a part 
of XX century structuralism.  
10 For an analysis form an architectural and surveillance perspectives, see:  Pablo Marquez. El ojo ve, el 
poder mira: La arquitectura para la vigilancia y el final de la privacidad.  Colección: Investigaciones. 
JAVEGRAF: Bogotá (2004). 
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Indeed, the structure of institutions and the architecture of human relations are governed 
by power11. This analysis is relevant for this project since it deals with how [the] 
mechanisms of powerhave begun to become economically advantageous and 
politically useful12.  
 
The latter is the main concern of Foucaults structural philosophy, which, using 
genealogy13 shows the (cor)relation between power, law and truth14. Foucaults main 
problem is the why of the how of power15; this is the mechanisms related to the formal 
delimitation of power and the effect that truth produces and transmits. His question, 
relevant for our analysis of capture, is: what rules of right are implemented by the 
relations of power in the production of discourses of truth? or what type of power is 
susceptible of producing discourses of truth that in a society [as ours] are endowed 
with [legitimizing]effect?16  
 
Indeed, in the case of industrial regulation, this power comes from knowledge produced, 
sponsored and legitimized by transnational corporations that is transformed in national 
and transnational regulation by harmonization. As Foucault concludes, the relation 
between power, truth and law is definitively economical since they must produce truth 
as we must produce wealth, and must produce truth in order to produce wealth17. 
Truth and power produce law, because we are subjected to truth in the sense in which 
it is truth that  [legitimizes] the laws18  
 
In addition, Foucault reads power as something employed and exercised that works in a 
positive net-externality where individuals act as vehicles19, in our case regulators can 
act as vehicles and ends of regulation. In synthesis, power is understood as a practice, an 
exercise, executed through knowledge and the law. The law, thus, works just as a 
technology of normalization20.  
                                                
11 See Michel Foucault, The Subject and Power, 8, 4 CRITICAL INQUIRY, 777, 777-79 (Harvester, 1982) 
12 Id. at 547a  
13 Genealogy is defined as a form of knowledge that works by isolating the components and structures of a 
political mechanism tracing it back its roots. See HUBERT L. DREYFUS & PAUL RABINOW. MICHEL 
FOUCAULT: BEYOND STRUCTUALISM AND HERMENEUTICS 119 (U. Chicago Press, 1982).   
14 MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY: AN INTRODUCTION (Penguin, 1978) 
(showing how slight manipulations of science and the legal system lead to the modern construction of 
sexual identity); SOCIETY MUST BE DEFENDED: LECTURES AT THE COLLÈGE DE FRANCE, 
1975-76, 23-42 (Mauro Bertani & Alessandro Fontana, eds., 2003) (exposing the genealogy of war and 
racism, and how the same discourse structure is evident in the new forms of racism). 
15 See supra note 11, and infra notes 16 and 20.  
16 Michel Foucault, Power, Right, Truth, in CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, Collin 
Gordon, (ed.) 543a (1998), originally published, in POWER/KNOWLEDGE, Colin Gordon (ed.) 92-108 
(Harvester, 1980). 
17 Id. at 543b.  
18 Id. at 543b [Italics out of original text]. 
19 Id. at 546a 
20 The concept of normalization is essential in Foucaults thought and in the so called, Foucault effect in 
social and political sciences. The word "normal" refers to the categorization of people, cultures, legal 
systems, etcetera, as opposed to forms considered "abnormal". Definitely, it is the result of incentives to 
standardize and achieve conformity with determined norms/rules/regulation. Normalization is the product 
of governmentality, this is the mentality of self govern or choose. Foucaults work goes around this issue, 
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Social psychology and social cognition, on the same hand, provide evidence to the latter 
statements. Knowledge structures, through categories, schemas and scripts determine 
how we understand the limitless information with we are confronted21, and therefore, 
they shape the way we give order to the world22.  These findings are aligned with the 
criticism set by Foucaults structural philosophy, as social psychology proves that 
humans tend to rely in knowledge structures to process information and, most 
importantly, to draw conclusions about factual situations23.   
 
These knowledge structures, as shown by Hanson and Chen24 in the case of Law and 
Economics, determine the cognitive processes of human behavior trough categories and 
schemas defined in the different epistemes (knowledge structures)25.  
 
In addition, behavioralism has provided a great deal of evidence on human behavior and 
the effect of power and situational forces26. Hanson and Yosifon show how the literature 
in behavioral studies has revealed that our dispositional character is as deep that even in 
circumstances where situational factors are visible, countable and acknowledged, we tend 
to be prone to disposition27 despite that situations are largely controlling. The authors are 
suggesting for legal theory that individuals do not act with total freedom as it has been 
assumed in most the economic models explaining human behavior, and this is applicable 
                                                                                                                                            
the problem of normalization/standardizations through norms and rules. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, 
DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON (Penguin, 1977) (showing how 
normalization could be achieved with technologies, as prison and surveillance, mediated by the law); see 
supra note 13 (arguing that the construction of sexual identity was a function of political and economic 
forces that lead to a set of rules that shaped what is a normal sexual behavior); see supra note 11 (showing 
Foucaults reconsideration of power as a matter of technologies of power and not as a matter of power 
itself); see supra note 14, at 1-42, 65-86 (answering how is that truth came to function as an arm [of 
power]).   
21 See Ron Chen & Jon Hanson, The Illusion of Law: The Legitimating Schemas of Modern Policy and 
Corporate Law, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (2004).  
22 See supra note 7.  
23 Ronald Chen & Jon D. Hanson, Categorically Biased: The Influence of Knowledge Structures on the 
Law and Legal Theory. 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 1103, 1125, 1217-18 (2004).  
24 See Id. (Showing how social psychology has offered a brad understanding of how individuals use 
categories, schemas and scripts to make sense of the world and showing the lack of attention that legal 
scholarship has given to this area of social science). See Id. at 1145-66 (explaining the categorization 
process and the effects of categorization in human cognition). See Id. at 1228-39 (showing the difficulties 
of controlling bias and debiasing cognition and the value of situational forces in such process), at 1243-44 
(showing how situational forces seen and unseen- have a strong effect on cognition and lead to a 
dispositional perspective of the world). See also infra note 28, at 1654-75 (showing how/why humans are 
attribute behavior to personal choice and its relation with situational motives). In addition, social 
psychology has shown that several motives lead us to self-affirm and protect our acquired schemas.  See 
ZIVA KUNDA, MAKING SENSE OF PEOPLE, SOCIAL COGNITION (1991); JOHN ANDERSON, 
COGNITIVE PSYCOLOGY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS, (3ed., 1990). 
25 See also: PABLO MARQUEZ. ANOTACIONES SOBRE ANÁLISIS ECONÓMICO DEL DERECHO: 
VOLUMEN I  (CEJA, 2005).  
26 See supra note 7 149-179 (summarizing the most important literature on behaviorism and the problem of 
situation and attribution error). See also, Hanson, Jon & David Yosifon, The Situational Character: A 
Critical Realist Perspective on the Human Animal,  93 GEO. L. J. 1 (2004);  
27 See Id. at 157-159; see also LEE ROSS & RICHARD NISBETT, THE PERSON AND THE 
SITUATION 127 (1991).  
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to regulators, policy makers and scholars. Rather, humans tend to choose moved by 
exogenous forces, making the assumptions of legal economist questionable28. 
 
Why these notions of power are useful and constitute an alternative for the analysis of 
economics and its relation with the international law and policy of industrial regulation 
harmonization? Certainly, understanding power as a matter of the technologies of power 
and why and how the use of truth -knowledge structures as mainstream industrial 
organization theory- and law -in this case industrial regulation-, as mechanisms of 
discipline and normalization29 provide a critical explanation to the dynamics of 
international economic law as a system of discipline mediated by capture30.   
 
All this literature is important for this research and constitutes the original thougs in this 
approach since it contributes to a new understanding of why it is important to think about 
capture of regulators involved in International Law policymaking that make them prone 
to support and attach to those schemas of liberalization/harmonization that are 
economically advantageous and politically useful31 for large corporations.  
 
Certainly, capture, understood as the processes and technologies to align regulators goals 
and cognition with those favorable to third parties, allows large commercial interest to 
promote and invest in the production of law via knowledge structures. And social 
psychology and structural philosophy contribute to shown that scholars, policymakers, 
lawyers, legislatures, judges and others are influenced by those schemas and scripts that 
shape our knowledge structures32 and, the product of their work is just the product of the 
interests assumed, received and perceived by the dynamic trilogy of power, truth and 
law33 that leads to the normalization of cognition.  
 
Thus, the effect of knowledge structures/truth is cognitive and legal, since they provide 
legitimization, scientific and juridical, to the goals of regulation, giving an order to 
events, and a script to derive conclusions about the aim of the law and the legal system34. 
As the invisibility and blinding effect35 of schemas give an advantage to those with the 
capacity/ability to create and produce dominant knowledge and give to it the status of 
truth36 and, hence, the ability to turn it into legal institutions. This is the main 
                                                
28 This point is studied in Hanson, Benforado and Yosifons article Broken Scales, where they offer an 
explanation of two phenomena, first, why the problem of obesity in the United States is usually addressed 
as a problem of choice and self-government and why it is not a problem of choice but a problem of 
situational forces manipulated to induce consumer behavior. See Adam Benforado, Jon Hanson & David 
Yosifon, Broken Scales: Obesity and Justice in America, 53 EMORY L. J. 1645 (2004). 
29 See supra note 14 at 45.  
30 As is used in supra note 7.  
31 See supra note 21. 
32 See supra note 21 at 74. 
33 See Id, 1-72. 
34 And mainstream Law and Economics, as a discipline, has also been studied as an epistemic tool of 
legitimization of the protection of certain interests in the legal system. See supra note 21 at 134-39 and 23 
at 1122-25, 1243-51. 
35 See Ron Chen & Jon Hanson. The Illusion of Law: The Legitimating Schemas of Modern Policy and 
Corporate Law, 103 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 1-2 (2004). 
36 See Foucault, note 11 and 16. 
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presumption of the critical realist perspective that we are using to challenge and set limits 
to the assumption that harmonization is a mechanism to achieve freedom, markets 
liberalization and, thus, prosperity37 when it is in constant tension. 
 
b. Capture, Harmonized Industrial Regulation and Liberalization.  
 
The discourse of harmonization is in the core of a barely unidentified field; this is the 
field of International Industrial Regulation, in International Economic Law38. As we said 
in our hypothesis, this policy of standardization and harmonization of regulation is the 
product of capture39. Few scholars have highlighted such capture in several ways40 but 
what seems the way to reveal such problem is to find tensions between the global policy 
for an international industrial regulation the economic and legal discourse of the 
advantages of harmonization. These tensions constitute the relationships between capture 
and harmonization that I want to investigate.  
 
The academic discourses of transnational regulation and governance heavily rely on 
economic theory showing the social benefits of harmonization of regulation41. Indeed, the 
                                                
37 See note 21 at 66. See also reading list, section 1, subsection, A & B.  
38 A Google Scholar search of international & industrial & regulation did not match any articles, and the 
same result was provided by J-Store (Economics, Finance, Law, Political Science, and General). A search 
of the words global industrial regulation did not match any result in Google Scholar but matched one 
result in J-Stor, an article by Eun Sup Lee, Efficient regulation of the insurance industry to cope with 
global trends of deregulation and liberalization (13 Bond L. Rev. 46-63, June 2001) (arguing, among other 
issues, that a uniform regulation of insurance industry not deregulation would lead to a more efficient risk 
dispersion and lower insurance costs). 
39 In the meaning used by Chen & Hanson, supra note 35.  
40 See Id.  
41 See also Raj Bhala, International Trade Law: Theory and Practice, (2d ed. 2001); Joanne Gowa and 
Edward Mansfield. 1993. Power Politics and International Trade. American Political Science Review 
87:2, pp. 408-420; Susan Strange, Territory, State, Authority and Economy: a new realist ontology of 
Global Political Economy in The new realism : perspectives on multilateralism and world order (Ed. 
Robert W. Cox, 1996); Martin Wolf, Why Globalization Works, Chapters 1 & 2, (Yale Press, 2005). 
Ruairi Brugha and Anthony B. Zwi, Regulation in the context of global health markets, in Health policy in 
a globalizing world. Edited by Kelley Lee, Kent Buse, and Suzanne Fustukian. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002); John Braithwaite, Peter Drahos. Global business regulation Cambridge, UK : New 
York, NY, USA : Cambridge University Press, 2000; Daniel C. Esty and Damien Geradin. Regulatory 
competition and the global coordination of labour standards, in Regulatory competition and economic 
integration: comparative perspectives. Edited by Daniel C. Esty and Damien Geradin. Oxford ; New York : 
Oxford University Press, 2001. Antitrust goes global: what future for transatlantic cooperation?; Simon J. 
Evenett, Alexander Lehmann, Benn Steil, editors. (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs; 
Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, c2000); Edward M. Graham, Substantive convergence and 
procedural dissonance in merger review, in Antitrust goes global: what future for transatlantic 
cooperation? Simon J. Evenett, Alexander Lehmann, Benn Steil, editors. (London: Royal Institute of 
International Affairs; Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, c2000); Mattli, Walter. Global private 
governance for voluntary standards setting: national organizational legacies and international institutional 
biases. Center for Business and Government, John F. Kennedy School of Government, (Harvard 
University, 2001); CHARLES A. JAMES, INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST IN THE 21ST CENTURY: 
COOPERATION AND CONVERGENCE, U.S. Department of Justice, OECD Global Forum on 
Competition, Paris, France, October 17, 2001,  http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/62/57/2438935.pdf  last 
viewed March 28, 2006; MAKAN DELRAHIM INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST AND 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: CHALLENGES ON THE ROAD TO CONVERGENCE, Deputy 
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academic reasoning goes as follows: First, global markets require liberalization; 
liberalization increases transnational competition; more transnational competition induces 
firms to take more risks; and thus there is need of harmonized sophisticated transnational 
regulation. Second, harmonization of regulation leads to improvements in the control of 
transnational industrial activity because, according to the economic literature, neither 
regulatory competition nor coordination of national policies42 conducted to optimal 
control of industrial activity43.  
 
These conclusions highlight the advantages of regulation and harmonization one 
regulation fits all economies-, but do not provide an explanation of the tension between 
the goals of globalization -essentially free markets are good and regulation bad- and the 
macroscript of harmonization -a single transnational regulation is better than multiple 
regulations. The strong interest for favoring harmonization in a global economy, despite 
the tension between a model of liberalization and a model of regulation, gives indicia to 
ask the question of capture of transnational regulators44.  
 
Unfortunately, several questions like is international regulatory harmonization moving up 
to more rigorous standards or down toward greater laxity, control the debate, but the 
question if harmonization is moved by political or market pressures, or questions about 
the different uses of the advantages of harmonization in different markets, or the role of 
international institutions, international regulators and dominant producers, and the 
reception of regulation trough harmonization, have not been raised yet.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
Assistant Attorney General, Presented at the American Bar Association, Section of Antitrust Law, 
Conference on Antitrust & Intellectual Property: the Courts, the Enforcers, and the Business World San 
Francisco, California, May 21, 2004. In, http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/205629.htm, last viewed 
march 28.  
42 See also Bob Jessop (1997), Capitalism and its Future: Remarks on Regulation, Government and 
Govemance, Review of Intemational Political Economy, 4 (3), Autumn, 561-81; Kizza, Joseph Migga & 
Jefferson, N.C.. Civilizing the Internet: global concerns and efforts toward regulation. (Kizza.: McFarland, 
c1998) ; Charles Goodhart, David Llewellyn, Philip Harmann, Steven R Weisbrod & Liliana Rojas-
Suarez. Financial Regulation: Why, How and Where Now? (Routledge, 2003); Daniel C. Esty and Damien 
Geradin. Regulatory competition and the global coordination of labour standards, in Regulatory 
competition and economic integration: comparative perspectives. Edited by Daniel C. Esty and Damien 
Geradin. Oxford ; New York : Oxford University Press, 2001; Competition policy in the global economy: 
modalities for co-operation edited by Leonard Waverman, William S. Comanor, and Akira Goto. (1997); 
Ogus,, Competition Between National Legal Systems: A Contribution of Economic Analysis to Comparative 
Law, 2 ICLQ 48, 410 (1999). 
43 I agree with the latter statement but not with the conclusion which leads to favor global harmonization as 
the best mechanism to control industrial and corporate behavior. 
44 Simmons gives a game theoretical model to explaining why dominant regulators think strategically, since 
they know that how other regulators will react to its regulation. In addition show how the regulatory 
pressures that US regulators have over world agencies is so huge that has the potentiality to change 
significantly the context of regulation in the rest of the world. See Beth Simmons, The International 
Politics of Harmonization: The Case of Capital Markets Regulation. 55 INT. ORGANIZATION. 589, 615-
20 (2001).  
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To further evidence our hypothesis and its tensions, we are going to study how 
convergence, international law and international standardization45 have a strong tendency 
to propose or impose harmonization of regulation on its different stages. The 
methodology we will use is to analyze the inner tensions in these policies. As a matter of 
fact, comparing harmonized regulations and its goals indicate the contradictions that the 
metatheory of global regulatory governance with the normalized regulation of certain 
industries. We expect to prove that the growth of the economics of harmonization of 
regulation is linked with transnational corporate interest to extend the gains of 
regulatory/deregulatory production in hegemonic countries. Legal economists in 
international economic law began to support it as the new best option for international 
regulation and development of industry in a globalized world but such support comes 
from those advocating for the extension of liberalization, which usually are big 
corporations.  
 
Several questions arise related to the legal specific discourses of harmonization. Why 
there is a differentiated discourse of harmonization for certain industry regulation as 
antitrust, intellectual property and financial markets but it is not applicable for other 
regulation as environmental and labor? Does convergence of antitrust laws increase 
industry concentration? Do capital adequacy standards enhance large financial 
corporations power in the international financial markets? Does a single regime of 
intellectual property promote general or just intellectual property producers growth? Does 
global corporate governance increases the power of corporate boards and managers over 
stockholders in internationalized stock markets?  
 
We have exposed why there is enough evidence to assume that it is possible to show how 
capture is a tool to understand the recent phenomena of harmonization of industrial 
regulation. The aforementioned architecture of the concept of harmonization shows that 
an extensive capture of regulation/regulators is in play, and the increasing idea of a 
selective global legal harmonization has a key role in the escalating size of transnational 
corporations. Indeed, it is not that harmonized legal systems require big corporations, but 
that big corporations require harmonized legal systems.   
 
 
 
III. GLOBAL INDUSTRIAL POLICY AND REGULATION: OXYMORONIC 
COEXISTENCE 
 
Why this discourse becomes interesting for a study of a barely unidentified field in 
international economic law, this is the international industrial regulation? The answer is 
not simple. As I stated in the first paragraphs, the international economic policy of 
standardization of industrial regulation is the product of false impressions that lead to an 
illusion. The theory has highlighted such illusion in several ways46, but what seems to be 
                                                
45 These different but attached discourses are the law as convergence  spontaneous international 
harmonized order-, and multilateral regulatory policy via international treaties - hard law and international 
regulatory standards - soft law. 
46 BOOKS criticizing globalization, Kennedys syllabus.. 
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more interesting is how it is possible to find a correlated tension between several free 
trade policies, most of the analysis of a global policy for an international industrial 
regulation, the discourse in economic and legal theory about the benefits of harmonized 
or normalized regulation, and the sustained increase in industrial concentrations.   
 
The main point is the tension in the meta-theory free-markets and the theory standardized 
industrial regulation. Indeed, the coexistence of markets and freedom is and ordoliberal47 
idea48 where the role of the State is simply to organize markets and not direct or plan 
them, since such intervention goes against freedom. Here, we can emphasize a theoretical 
tension between the Austrian or libertarian model, where freedom and institutions are not 
to be designed, but should arise through cooperation49. Thus, the neoclassical faith in 
institutional design and the libertarian idea of a spontaneous order show the first tension 
in the discourse of these models. If freedom leads to self regulation, why markets must be 
regulated?  
 
On the other hand, the discourses of global regulations seem to rely on the economic 
theory showing the social benefits of harmonization. As we have highlighted, there is 
enough evidence to distrust of the theoretical constructions and the knowledge structures 
and schemas that have aroused from the contemporary economic discourse. Not only its 
highly dispositional constructions, but also its lack of attention to its possible bias leads 
to distrust on the results of such theoretical constructions50.  
 
 
IV. EVIDENCING INNER CONTRADICTIONS: LEGAL CONVERGENCE, 
SOFT LAW AND HARD LAW 
 
To evidence the latter statements, we will study three of the different theoretical 
meanings given to the word law in International Economic Law and how they have a 
meaning in a global regulatory policy. These are the law as convergence  spontaneous 
international harmonized order-, and multilateral regulatory policy via international 
treaties - hard law and international regulatory standards - soft law.  As it is evident, 
these three phenomena imply an immense amount of industrial regulation, the objective, 
in each case, will be study one among several problems. Hence, in convergence, we will 
study the nowadays called global antitrust law; second, in hard law we will study the 
internationalization of intellectual property rights true international treaties and third, in 
soft law, we will study the case the capital accords in financial markets. 
 
The methodology we will use to study the inherent contradictions in this policy and the 
harmonized regulations and its effect  markets concentration. We want to reveal and 
scrutinize the common meta-theory of the global regulation policy inherent in Austrian 
                                                
47 Ordo-liberalism assumes that the State is a designer. As designer, the State creates all the institutional 
circumstances to maintain a healthy level to foster competition according to market principles.  
48 MICHEL FOUCAULT, RÉSUMÉ DES COURS, 1970-1982, 119 (Julliard, 1989), cited by Id. at 57. 
49 See LUDWIG VON MISES, HUMAN ACTION, 2003 (Mises Institute, 2004); Friedrick Hayek, Road to 
Serfdom, (1993). 
50 See supra note 23 and accompanying text.  
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economics and neo-classical economics51. Then, show the macro-theory of each of the 
examples -economics of industrial organization and regulation. After that, analyze the 
micro-script. And, following such study, we will highlight the tensions and non-
theoretical effects of such regulation in international and national markets. Evidence of 
such phenomenon will be theoretical, showing the contradictions between the discourses 
and the regulation, and empirical, showing the effect with economic data52 and 
econometric analysis.  
 
a. Convergence and Global Antitrust Law 
 
Convergence has been an interesting suggestion in law and economics literature53 from a  
long time but, suspiciously, the convergence discourse54 is regularly proposed by tending 
to expand common law regimes55. In competition policy convergence refers to reaching 
consistency in antitrust law, policy, processes and economic theory across jurisdictional 
lines56. The reasons are several for the recurrence of a transnational policy and the 
global antitrust law has increased in the last years57, but most policymakers and legal 
economists argue for consistency in procedures, fairness in legal application and 
reduction of transaction costs58.  
 
                                                
51 Principally explained by R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 90-91, 107-115 (1978) (asserting 
that antitrust laws promote wealth-maximization at the sacrifice of consumer welfare). 
52 I cannot continue without highlighting the problem with data: who to rely on data provided? 
53 See LARRY CATÁ BACKER, HARMONIZING LAW IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION: 
CONVERGENCE, DIVERGENCE AND RESISTANCE (Carolina Press, 2005) ();  RICHARD POSNER, 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (8 ed. 1998) (supporting that the common law is more efficient than 
the civil law and therefore, the legal systems will converge to the common law institutional system);  See 
Mark J. Roe Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 Harvard L. Rev., 641 (1996) (evaluating the 
classical paradigm of evolution of institutions and efficiency, and including chaos theory and mostly path 
dependency).  
54 Edward T. Swaine, The Local Law of Global Antitrust, 43 William & Mary L. Rev. 627, 641-46 (2001). 
William E. Kovacic, Getting Started: Creating New Competition Policy Institutions in Transition 
Economies, 23 Brook. J. Intl L. 403, 403-08 (1997) (describing creation of competition policy systems as 
element of law reform in transition economies). Timothy J. Muris, Competition Agencies in a Market-
Based Global Economy (Brussels, Belgium, July 23, 2002) (Prepared remarks at the Annual Lecture of the 
European Foreign Affairs Review), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/muris/020723/brussels. 
EDUARD M GRAHAM & J. DAVID RICHARDSON, COMPETITION POLICIES FOR THE GLOBAL 
ECONOMY (1997). 
55 The production of economic theory and legal theory are usually leaded by common law countries. See  
Chistoph Kern. Between Formalization and Simplification of Justice. (2007) On file with the author.   
56 See Einer Elhauge & Damien Geradin, GLOBAL ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS 2 
(unpublished manuscript -on file with the authors). 
57 As well as the number of mergers of big transnational corporations as Miller and Bavaria, Procter and 
Gable and Gillette, among many other.  
58 See Edward T. Swaine, The Local Law of Global Antitrust, 43 William & Mary L. Rev. 627, 641-46 
(2001). William E. Kovacic, Getting Started: Creating New Competition Policy Institutions in Transition 
Economies, 23 Brook. J. Intl L. 403, 403-08 (1997) (describing creation of competition policy systems as 
element of law reform in transition economies). Timothy J. Muris, Competition Agencies in a Market-
Based Global Economy (Brussels, Belgium, July 23, 2002) (Prepared remarks at the Annual Lecture of the 
European Foreign Affairs Review), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/muris/020723/brussels. 
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Some International Organizations have recommended the initiation of national efforts to 
implement a set of best practices in order to achieve those ends, increase social wealth 
and guarantee consumer sovereignty59. Some scholars have suggested that such process 
of convergence has started60 in the competition policy of the UE and the US since the 
biggest market transactions have been developed among corporations based in such 
geographical locations. But, according to other authors, this aspired convergence will 
only increase corporate power and will make national industrial policies just a chimera of 
the past61.  
 
The questions are: Is harmonization of antitrust regulation a profit maximizing 
mechanism or a cost minimizing instrument? Is harmonization a shared industrial interest 
that could lead to cost minimization of corporate growth? (Or is harmonization a way to 
reduce the costs of concentration and market power?) As we said before, capture is a 
technology of power and economics has provided a barely un-criticized knowledge 
structure that acknowledges that the realities of economics are common among nations 
and scholars cannot ignore that part of a global community and that ideas generated on 
one continent cannot safely be cabined and ignored on the others62. Deep capture of 
scholars and deep capture of policymakers seem to go hand by hand63 and this research is 
aiming to theoretically show how policy and regulation are in an inner tension 
highlighting the findings of structuralism and social and behavioral psychology-, and 
econometrically why goals of policy are not attained by regulation.  
 
b. Voluntary Standardization of Minimum Capital Requirements in Banking  
 
The idea of capital adequacy in banking and financial institutions law has been grounded 
in the idea of systemic risk credit, market and operational risk- and public safety64. The 
idea of minimum capital requirements and capital adequacy has gained relevancy in the 
international regulation and international industrial policy with the extension of markets, 
the partial liberalization of money flows and cross-border operation of financial 
                                                
59 ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT  [OECD]. Best 
Practices for the Formal Exchange of Information Between Competition Authorities in Hard Core Cartel 
Investigations (2005), OECD, Recommendation of the Council concerning merger review (2005); OECD, 
Recommendation of the Council concerning structural separation in regulated industries (2001); OECD, 
Recommendation of the Council concerning effective action against hard core cartels (1998); OECD, 
Recommendation of the Council concerning co-operation between member countries on anticompetitive 
practices affecting international trade (1995).  
60 Eleanor M. Fox, US and EU Competition Law: A Comparison, in GLOBAL COMPETITION POLICY 
edited by J. David Richardson and Edward M. Graham (1997). See Einer Elhauge & Damien Geradin, 
GLOBAL ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS (unpublished manuscript -on file with the authors). 
61 See Douglas E. Rosenthal & Phendon Nicolaides, Harmonizing Antitrust: the less effective way to 
promote international competition, in GLOBAL COMPETITION POLICY edited by J. David Richardson 
and Edward M. Graham (1997).  
62 Einer Elhauge & Damien Geradin, GLOBAL ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS 2 (unpublished 
manuscript -on file with the authors). 
63 Supra notes 7, 21 and 23 and accompanying text.  
64 HAL SCOTT, INTERNATIONAL FINANACE Chapter Seven, 1 (Forthcomming) (On file with the 
author). See João A. C. Santos, Bank Capital Regulation in Contemporary Banking Theory: A Review of 
the Literature, 10, 2 Financial Markets, Institutions & Instruments 41 (May 2001). 
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institutions. This relevancy has struggled with two opposite propositions about the 
dynamics and process of industrial regulation, this is harmonization or competition.  
 
Regulatory competition has been an issue in several debates of industries regulation. 
Fiscal and financial paradises are the product of such idea and the growth of a few small 
countries65 and many banking corporations has been its product. Harmonization of 
regulation, on the other hand, competes with the idea of competition, since, according to 
the authors defending such idea, it leads to a fair and easy flow of capitals and public 
safety66.  
 
However, the Bank of International Settlements worried about cross-national banking 
supervision, the possibilities of systemic risk and its consequences for the global 
economy, set up the Committee on Banking and Supervisory Practices (with 10 
members), called the Basel Committee67 on Banking Supervision. The goal of such 
committee is to provide a forum for regular cooperation on banking supervisory 
matters68 but this forum is more than an advisory and has become in a global regulator 
and global think tank of capital requirements and capital adequacy. Its members are the 
Central Banks of the ten richest countries in the World (G10)69 and home-base of the 
worlds biggest financial institutions.  
 
After describing these approaches, several questions arise. Based in the global analysis, 
the metascript of markets is grounded in the idea of freedom and competition. If it is so, 
why not to maintain a market approach where only those disciplined financial institutions 
survive? Why, if the consumer is sovereign, there must be just one regulation concerning 
to capital regulation? In the answer to these questions we can find the inner tensions in 
the discourse of international industrial regulation of Banking70. Risk seems to be the 
main concern of scholars and the industry71, but in certain way what capital adequacy 
does is increase concentrations and impede competition. Thus, the highly appreciated 
freedom in the global money flow discourse is in a constant tension with the regulation of 
capital adequacy, and many other regulations concerning banking and financial services. 
The reality that I plan to explore here is why and how the harmonization capital adequacy 
favors international financial institutions minimization of costs, and why there is a strong 
interest in developing a transnational structure of capital adequacy.  
                                                
65 As Switzerland, Caiman Islands, Panama, etc.   
66 See P Cooke, CAPITAL BANK ADEQUACY (1991); Thomas Hellmann, Kevin C.Murdock & Joseph 
E. Stiglitz, Liberalization,moral hazard in banking, and prudential regulation: Are capital requirements 
enough? 90 American Economic Review 147 (2000).  
67 See John D Wagster, Impact of the 1988 Basel Accord on international banks, 51 Journal of Finance 
1321-1346, (1996).P Cooke, CAPITAL BANK ADEQUACY (1991).  
68 About the Basel Committee. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. BANK OF INTERNATIONAL 
SETTLEMENTS, in http://www.bis.org/bcbs/index.htm, viewed March 28, 2006.  
69 Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States.  
70 Several scholars have found these tensions. See Rojas-Suarez, Liliana, "Can International Capital 
Standards Strengthen Banks In Emerging Markets?" . Institute for International Economics Working Paper 
No. 01-10. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=300895 or DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.300895;  
71 See Pablo Marquez. Cost Benefit Analysis, Statistical Value of Life and Regulation: Prospective 
Challenges. Universitas Ciencias Jurídicas (Indexada), No. 113, Bogotá, (2007 - En Prensa).   
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c. International Intellectual Property Law  
 
For several years regulation of intellectual property has have a transnational pattern. The 
arguments for an international of intellectual property regime do not vary much from the 
traditional arguments for the protection of intellectual property rights; both rely on the 
advantages of property to incentive free trade and economic growth72. These seem to be 
the same reasons for every single regime of industrial regulation that we have 
highlighted. Freedom, markets and prosperity in the words of wealth, growth or profits 
maximization- are attached as an ordoliberal mentality. 
 
In fact, as special as intellectual property is, its main justification is based in its effect on 
growth and its supposedly clear incidence in innovative activity73. Indeed, many authors 
assure that intellectual property enforcement leads to higher product and productivity 
growth, higher foreign direct investment rates and many other advantages74. On the other 
hand, theoretical and empirical studies75 have proven that, not in every case, enforcement 
of intellectual property rights leads to growth or higher foreign direct investment rates76 
and on the opposite, internationally, they increase the likelihood to innovate and, 
following their own assumptions, to growth77. In addition, the mere fact that intellectual 
                                                
72 See G. J. MOSSINGHOFF, The importance of intellectual property protection in international trade, 7 
B. C. INT. & COM. L. REV., 235-249 (1984), WILLIAM NORDHAUS, INVENTION, GROWTH, AND 
WELFARE: A THEORETICAL TREATMENT OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 3-7 (1969); Dasgupta, 
Partha S. and Joseph E. Stiglitz, Industrial Structure and the Nature of Innovative Activity, 90 ECONOMIC 
JOURNAL, 266-93 (1980), Reinganum, Jennifer F., Innovation and Industry Evolution, 100 
QUARTERLY J. OF ECON., 81-99 (1985); Gerald J. Mossinghoff and Vivian S. Kuo., World Patent 
System Circa 20xx, A.D, 38 IDEA 529 (1998); D.M. GOULD, y W.C. GRUBEN., The role of IPR in 
economic growth, 48 J. DEVELOP. ECON. 323-350 . Peter Menell, Intellectual Property: General 
Theories, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW & ECONOMICS (2000); Keith E. Makus, Lessons From 
Studying the International Economics of Intellectual Property Rights, 53 Vand. L. Rev. 2219-2239 (2000); 
Sakakibara Mariko & Lee Branstetter, Do Stronger Patents Induce More Innovation? Evidence from the 
1988 Japanese Patent Law Reforms, 32 RAND J. OF ECON. 77 (2001). 
73 See Pablo Marquez, Critical Analysis of the Justification and Economic Foundations of the Intellectual 
Property Rights System. Revista Derecho y Sociedad, Universidad Católica del Perú. Lima, Perú, No. 25, 
(2005); Edward C. Hettinger, Justifying Intellectual Property, PHIL. & PUB. AFF. (1989); Lawrence C. 
Becker, Deserving to Own Intellectual Property, 68 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 609 (1993); Ejan Mackaay, 
Economic incentives in markets for information and innovation, 13 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POLY 867 (1990).  
74 See supra note 72.   
75 Pablo Marquez. Violación a los derechos de propiedad intelectual: un enfoque alternativo aplicado a la 
piratería de software. Colección: Investigaciones. Editorial JAVEGRAF: Bogotá (2004). 
76 Tom Palmer, Are Patents and Copyrights Morally Justified? The Philosophy of Property Rights and 
Ideal Objects, 13 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POLY. 817 (1990); Frank H. Easterbrook, Intellectual Property Is 
Still Property, 13 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POLY 108 (1990); Edmund Kitch, Taking Stock: The Law and 
Economics of Intellectual Property Rights: Elementary and Persistent Errors in the Economic Analysis of 
Intellectual Property, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1727 (2000); Shavell Steven and Tanguy van Ypersele, Rewards 
versus Rights, 44 J. L. & ECON. 525-547 (2001). 
77 Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in 
Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (1998); Sakakibara Mariko & Lee Branstetter, Do Stronger Patents 
Induce More Innovation? Evidence from the 1988 Japanese Patent Law Reforms, 32 RAND J. OF ECON. 
77 (2001). 
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property is based in a monopolistic privileges structure makes its effects differ from the 
effects derived from the structure of property based in physical appropriation of goods78.  
 
In any case, the debate over the convenience or inconvenience of international 
intellectual property regimes is over, since almost all the states have subscribed the 
multilateral treaties79 that oblige them to comply and harmonize their intellectual 
property legislation. And it is not a surprise that such regime follows the structure 
established in the group of countries that have an intensive production of intellectual 
property. Why this harmonization was required? Some assert that it makes easier trade 
and technology transfers80 but, why is there such a strong interest, -shared interest-, of 
international corporations to harmonize legal regimes? Why such industrial regime 
should be the one already defined in countries as the UK and the US?  
 
V. CONCLUSION: DISCURSIVE CORRELATIONS AND EVIDENCE  
 
We hope we have exposed why there is sufficient evidence to assume that it is possible to 
talk about an international regime of industrial regulation. The architecture of such 
regime could make capture of international regulators easier and the increasing idea of a 
global legal harmonization plays a key role in the escalating size of corporations in the 
whole world.  
 
What make interesting and evident the problems and ideas we just highlighted is the 
theoretical tensions that freedom, markets and regulation have. The inner contradictions 
in the different industrial regimes lead to just one final effect, higher concentrations. Two 
questions arise here: is harmonization of a shared industrial interest that leads to 
prosperity - wealth and growth? Or is harmonization a way to reduce the costs of 
concentration and market power? In our perspective, legal harmonization is set as a 
mechanism to increase freedom, smooth international trade and control market power but 
its result is simply more and easier mechanism to industry concentrations. Convergence 
of antitrust laws increase industry concentration; capital adequacy of financial 
institutions beget greater market concentrations; the whole idea intellectual property as a 
mechanism to promote growth, cause concentrations; In addition, the idea of a global 
corporate governance, increases the likelihood to concentrate and maintain the global 
structure of corporations. We could go on and on reviewing literature and market effects 
to show how the contradiction of freedom, markets and regulations are just a chimera, 
where the law produced by the State, or a league of States, is just an illusion and the 
knowledge structures behind them are just a normalization technology.  
                                                
78  See Ruth Gana, Has Creativity Died in the Third World? Some Implications of the Internationalization 
of Intellectual Property, 24 DENV. K. INTL L. & POLY 109 (1995); Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. 
Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 
(1998); Robert Feinberg y Donald Roussiang, The economic effects of intellectual property right 
infringements, 63, 1 J. Business, 79 (1990). 
79 About the insignificance of international treaties on IPR violation see: Pablo Marquez, Tratados 
Multilaterales y la Protección a los Derechos de Propiedad Intelectual: Evidencia entre Países, 
International Law (Indexada), No. 5, Bogotá  (2004).  
80 G. J. MOSSINGHOFF, The importance of intellectual property protection in international trade, 7 B. C. 
INT. & COM. L. REV., 235-249 (1984).  
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